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Crying Over the Inferred Existence of Spilled
Milk: The Demonstrable Illogic of
Ortega v. Kmart
Paul K. Hoffman* and Norman L. Geisler**
If it was so, it might be; and if it were so, it would be; but as it isn’t, it
ain’t. That’s logic.
—Tweedledee, Alice in Wonderland

Richard Ortega was not an observant fellow. Ordinarily,
this shortcoming works against a litigant, but not in his case.
Perhaps he was simply lucky enough to hire a very good lawyer
or clever enough to actually trick the California Supreme Court.
Either way, he more than made up for a lack of perceptive skills
by securing a stunning change in the law of storekeeper liability.
Stunning, because basic rules of logic were violated by the court
when crafting its decision in Ortega v. Kmart.1
While shopping at Kmart, Mr. Ortega was injured when he
slipped and fell.2 Apparently he did not see the puddle of milk
directly in his path.3 Worse still, he made no inspection or
assessment of the milk as he lay there on the floor. Was it cold
and fresh? Was it old and stinky? Had it dried around the edges
of the puddle or turned into cottage cheese? He didn’t notice.
Consequently, when Mr. Ortega sued Kmart and brought the
claim to trial, no one could say how long the milk had been on the
floor.4 Because Kmart had failed to inspect the store before the
accident, the spill, in theory, could have been there a couple
hours. But it was equally possible that the milk appeared just
seconds before Mr. Ortega fell. Simply put, the length of time the
dangerous condition existed was a mystery, and still is.
* Attorney; Adjunct Professor of Law, Trinity Law School; B.A. in Economics,
Westmont College; J.D., University of California at San Francisco, Hastings College of the
Law; M.A. in Religion, Southern Evangelical Seminary.
** Provost and Distinguished Professor of Apologetics, Veritas Evangelical Seminary;
B.A. in Philosophy, Wheaton College; M.A. in Theology, Wheaton Graduate School; Th.B.,
William Tyndale College; Ph.D. in Philosophy, Loyola University; author or co-author of
more than 70 books, including COME, LET US REASON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGICAL
THINKING (1990).
1 Ortega v. Kmart, 36 P.3d 11 (Cal. 2001).
2 Id. at 14.
3 Id.
4 Id.
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To the dismay of retailers everywhere, Mr. Ortega’s inability
to establish the amount of time that the dangerous condition
actually existed set the stage for a change in the law of
storekeeper liability that literally defies logic. Before Ortega, the
applicable law was both reasonable and straightforward.
Storekeepers were held liable for injuries caused by dangerous
conditions only if they had actual knowledge of the condition and
failed to clean it up.5 And if the storekeeper claimed ignorance,
the injured customer could satisfy the required element of
knowledge by proving that the dangerous condition had existed
long enough for a reasonable storekeeper to have discovered and
corrected it. This principle of law is known as “constructive
knowledge,”6 and it is eminently sensible. If it is known that a
reasonable storekeeper would have discovered and corrected a
longstanding dangerous condition, it is certainly reasonable to
impute knowledge of the longstanding condition to the
storekeeper. So, for example, had Mr. Ortega demonstrated that
the puddle of milk had begun to dry and turn to cottage cheese,
he would have proven its longstanding existence and thereby
imputed knowledge of the condition to Kmart.
But such was not the case. As noted, no one knew how long
the milk had been there.7 Consequently, Kmart had no actual or
constructive knowledge that the puddle even existed. And
naturally, one must know a spill exists before one can be
obligated by law to clean it up. In short, a thing must actually
exist before it can be known to exist. And so, under the old rule,
Kmart could not be held liable.
We may surmise from the high court’s opinion that Mr.
Ortega’s lawyer responded with an argument along these lines:
But hold on, we clearly know that the spill actually existed, otherwise
my client would not have been injured. The only question is how long
the spill was there. And it’s Kmart’s fault that no one knows since it
failed to properly inspect the store. Had it made regular inspections,
who knows, it might have found the spill, cleaned it up, and prevented
my client’s injury.

Arguments of the woulda-coulda-shoulda variety ordinarily
carry little weight in the courtroom. But not in this case. The
California Supreme Court was impressed, so impressed, in fact,
that it constructed a rule of law shared by no other state.8
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1981).
See, e.g., Hatfield v. Levy Bros., 117 P.2d 841, 845–46 (Cal. 1941); Louie v.
Hagstrom's Food Stores, 184 P.2d 708, 711 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947).
7 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
8 The Ortega court's reasoning, and the rule it yielded, were undeniably unique,
though the decision in Glover v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 536 P.2d 401 (Okla. Civ. App.
5
6
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Ortega v. Kmart was, undoubtedly, an effort by the high court to
remedy the perceived inequity of the storekeeper always
benefiting—and the customer always suffering—from the parties’
lack of information. Surely, some customers may have been
injured by long-standing dangerous conditions but were
precluded from recovery simply because no one could
demonstrate how long the condition had existed. Moreover,
storekeepers are often the only source of such information. The
specter of storekeepers suppressing such evidence was always a
realistic concern.
But the California Court leveled the playing field by ruling
that evidence of the lack of an inspection could be used to fill the
gap in the customer’s case.9 The gap to be filled was the
storekeeper’s knowledge of the dangerous condition. Obviously, a
storekeeper who is remiss in making safety inspections will have
no knowledge of existing dangerous conditions. In one sense, it
actually worked to the storekeeper’s benefit to refrain from
making inspections. Ignorance, it would seem, was not only
bliss, but legally advantageous.
Addressing the perceived
injustice that may befall Mr. Ortega and those similarly situated,
the court framed the issue and announced its ruling as follows:
The question here is: If the plaintiff has no evidence of the source of
the dangerous condition or the length of time it existed, may the
plaintiff rely solely on the owner’s failure to inspect the premises
within a reasonable period of time in order to establish an inference
that the defective condition existed long enough for a reasonable
person exercising ordinary care to have discovered it? We conclude
that the evidence of the owner’s failure to inspect the premises within
a reasonable period of time is sufficient to allow an inference that the
condition was on the floor long enough to give the owner the
opportunity to discover and remedy it.10

1974), was arguably similar in some respects. Like the Ortega court, the Glover court
ruled that constructive notice may be imputed in the absence of evidence establishing the
length of time the condition existed. Id. at 408–09. But it did so for reasons that are not
clearly stated. Moreover, it did not contend that the absence of an inspection permits an
inference regarding the actual amount of time the condition existed. Ortega is also
plainly distinguishable from decisions in a handful of states where, for public policy
reasons, the courts shift the burden of proof to the storekeeper regarding the amount of
time the condition existed once the plaintiff establishes that the dangerous condition was
reasonably predictable or of a type that commonly occurred in the defendant's premises.
For example, in both Bozza v. Vornado, 200 A.2d 777, 779–81 (N.J. 1964) and Jasko v.
F.W. Woolworth, 494 P.2d 839, 840–41 (Colo. 1972), the courts held that it was
appropriate to require the defendants to come forward with proof that the dangerous
condition would occur. The Ortega court did not purport to adopt a new burden-shifting
policy.
9 Id. at 13.
10 Id.
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Now, under Ortega, the undisciplined storekeeper has no
hiding place. The lack of an inspection may be presented to a
jury as evidence from which they may, by 9-to-12 votes,
collectively “infer” a period of time that the dangerous condition
is deemed to have actually existed. For example, if there is no
evidence of how long the condition actually existed, but there is
evidence that no inspection was done for a two-hour period before
the accident, the jury may infer that the dangerous condition
actually existed the full two hours. Two hours’ time is more than
enough to impute constructive knowledge of the condition to the
storekeeper, and thus the element of notice is satisfied; the gap
in the customer’s case is filled.
It is important to note that Ortega created new law not by
modifying the rules of evidence, but by adopting a novel legal
fiction. The court did not deem the absence of an inspection to be
relevant evidence of the storekeeper’s knowledge of the
dangerous condition, for it clearly is not. Instead, the Court
ruled that where there is no evidence of the length of time the
dangerous condition existed, the absence of an inspection may
then be used by the jury to “infer” an actual period of time the
condition existed and so impute knowledge to the storekeeper.11
This is a legal fiction, and it precisely fits the definition offered
by Black’s Law Dictionary:
An assumption that something is true even though it may be untrue,
made esp. in judicial reasoning to alter how a legal rule operates.12

Most legal fictions have a rational connection to some
established legal principle,13 but the fiction embraced by the
Ortega court does not. It is plainly false—and, in that sense,
irrational to suggest—that the absence of an inspection
constitutes probative evidence from which one can infer the
amount of time the uninspected condition actually existed. For
what it’s worth, it is true that one may logically infer a range of
time in which the condition could have existed. The inferred
range of time will always run from (a) the time of the last known
inspection to (b) the moment before the accident occurred. But it
is quite impossible to reasonably infer from the absence of an
inspection the actual amount of time the dangerous condition in
fact existed. To arbitrarily posit its actual existence for two
hours simply because it could have existed two hours is not a
rational inference.
Ortega, 36 P.3d at 13.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 913 (8th ed. 2004).
For example, the legal fiction of constructive trust is imposed where a wrongdoer
has acquired bare legal title to property. The fiction of a trust is rational since the only
element missing from an ordinary trust is the amicable intent of the parties. Id. at 1547.
11
12
13
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The illogic of Ortega is all the more troubling when viewed in
its full context of constructing a theory for imputing knowledge to
a storekeeper. Recall, a storekeeper cannot be held liable in tort
without knowledge of the dangerous condition. He is deemed to
have knowledge of the condition if it has actually existed for a
sufficient period of time.14 But with Ortega we are asked to
accept the bootstrapping notion that the dangerous condition is
deemed to have actually existed long enough to impute
knowledge.15 Playing with epistemology—what we can know—is
a common practice of the judiciary. But monkeying with
metaphysics—what really exists—opens up a whole new universe
of problems.
PUTTING ORTEGA TO THE TEST
I.
The rule in Ortega is demonstrably illogical in two respects.
First, the rule cannot be applied to real-world facts in a coherent
and valid series of truth functional propositions (e.g., If P then Q;
If Q then R; P; therefore R). Second, when stated as a categorical
syllogism, the Ortega inference violates what is traditionally
identified as the fourth rule of categorical syllogisms: an
affirmative conclusion cannot follow from a negative premise.16
All men are Mortal; Socrates is a Man; Therefore, Socrates is
Mortal, is a classic example of a sound categorical syllogism. But
the rule in Ortega is akin to mangling this argument by
declaring, All men are mortal; Angels are not mortal; Socrates is
Not an angel; therefore, Socrates is a man. The conclusion,
though true, does not follow from the premises. Given the truth
of the first three premises, Socrates could just as well be a puddle
of spilled milk. Let us then learn from Mr. Ortega and be careful
where we step as we first examine the rule’s coherence.
A. The Ortega rule is incoherent
Unlike the rule in Ortega, the old rule—imputing
constructive knowledge of longstanding dangerous conditions—
can be stated as a coherent series of truth functional
propositions. First, the key terms must be defined:

See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
Ortega, 36 P.3d at 18 (allowing the plaintiff to use circumstantial evidence to
prove that the dangerous condition existed for an unreasonable time by providing
evidence that an inspection had not been made within a particular period of time prior to
the accident, which warranted the inference that the defective condition existed long
enough so that a store employee would have discovered it with reasonable care, thereby
establishing the constructive knowledge standard).
16 PATRICK J. HURLEY, A CONCISE INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 268–69 (5th ed. 1994);
MORRIS R. COHEN & ERNEST NAGEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 78–79 (1962).
14
15
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Let “C” stand for the actual existence of a longstanding dangerous
condition
Let “K” stand for the storekeeper’s knowledge of the dangerous
condition
Let “L” stand for the storekeeper being liable to the injured party.

Having defined these terms, the old rule, presented in symbolic
logic, is as follows:
If C then K

or

C

K

If K then L

K

L

C, therefore L

C

L

The rule is valid since the conclusion follows from the premises.
And, arguably, it is also sound (i.e., true) since the premises
(given the appropriate facts) are actually true.
By contrast, there is simply no way to coherently state the
rule in Ortega, since to arrive at the conclusion of an affirmative
“C” one must, at some point in the argument, interpose an
arbitrary reversal of the initial necessary condition of “not K”
(~K). The initial condition of ~K is necessary since it is stated by
the Court as the very reason for implementing the rule in Ortega.
In other words, since we do not know how long the dangerous
condition existed we cannot say that the storekeeper had any
knowledge of the dangerous condition and, consequently, cannot
hold the storekeeper liable for the customer’s injuries under the
old rule. Remember, the very purpose of the rule in Ortega is to
arrive at the conclusion that the dangerous condition actually
existed long enough to impute constructive knowledge.17 Thus,
the beginning point of the analysis is the presumed fact that the
storekeeper has no actual or constructive knowledge of the
dangerous condition. Accordingly, we must begin to state the
rule in Ortega by first asserting that “~ K” is true. We must also
introduce a new term, the storekeeper’s inspection of the
premises. So, we will let “I” stand for the storekeeper conducting
reasonable inspections of the store. The other terms are as
stated in the old rule. Here then is Ortega’s formulation of the
presumed conditions that lead to the rule:
~K

(~I

C)

~K
~I

17

C

See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
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In narrative form, the argument for the rule is the following:
If the storekeeper has no knowledge of the dangerous condition (~K),
then, if he did not conduct a reasonable inspection (~I) we may
reasonably infer that the dangerous condition actually existed long
enough to impute knowledge of its existence (C). We know that the
storekeeper had no knowledge (~K); therefore, if the storekeeper did
not perform a proper inspection (~I) we may then infer the actual
existence of the dangerous condition for a period of time sufficient to
impute constructive knowledge (C).

Thus the rule in Ortega, simply put, is ~I C, and it is based on
the initial condition of ~K.
The problem arises when the rule is applied to real facts.
Here is how the rule was applied to the real facts of the Ortega
case:
~I
C

C {the Ortega rule}
K {the old rule}
K

L

~I {the facts}
L

Notice that in applying the Ortega rule one must interpose a
reversal of the presumed initial condition of ~K. Through slight
of hand, the acknowledged ~K becomes K. Reversing a presumed
fact is, of course, logically incoherent. Thus, the rule cannot be
coherently applied in the real world.
B. The Ortega rule is invalid
Moreover, as noted above, there is no way to apply the rule
in Ortega under a categorical syllogism without improperly
drawing an affirmative conclusion from a negative premise. The
legal conclusion of any application of the rule will always be:
“Therefore, the dangerous condition actually existed long enough
to impute constructive knowledge.” This type of statement is
known as a universal affirmative proposition, or a Type A
categorical statement. But one of the premises in any syllogism
intended to support this conclusion will always be: “The
storekeeper did not conduct proper inspections.” This is a
universal negative proposition, or Type E statement. And the
fourth rule of categorical syllogisms provides that no affirmative
conclusion can follow from a negative premise. That is, one
simply cannot formulate a valid syllogistic argument
incorporating a negative premise while drawing a positive
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conclusion.18 And yet, there is no other way of attempting to
apply the rule in Ortega. Of necessity, one must always assert
that the storekeeper did not conduct a safety inspection and, as a
result, the jury is then free to conclude that the dangerous
condition did actually exist long enough to impute constructive
knowledge. Consequently, the rule in Ortega is both functionally
and inherently illogical.
II. LESSONS FROM ORTEGA
There are two lessons to be learned here. The first is that
due consideration should be given to incorporating the study of
logic in standard law school curricula. Lawyers and law students
tend to be natural rhetoricians who instinctively emphasize
pathos over logos. But litigating with logos is essential for the
stability of the law if not our entire culture. And it is an acquired
skill. Accordingly, thinking correctly should be emphasized in
the education of lawyers and judges at least as much as arguing
effectively.
The second lesson is not a new one: judicial candor is the
best policy. It appears that the California Supreme Court was
not entirely candid in the way it approached this case and,
predictably, got caught in a web of non-sequiturs. The members
of the court surely recognized the falsity of their key assertion,
“the evidence of defendant’s failure to inspect the premises
within a reasonable period of time prior to the accident . . .
creates a reasonable inference that the dangerous condition
existed long enough for it to be discovered by the owner.”19
Though useful in constructing a rule that favors shoppers and
encourages storekeepers’ diligence, the proposition is plainly
false.
Employing an obviously false premise in an argument is not
rational. But declaring a desired change in public policy is.
Instead of constructing a novel legal argument to support a
desired outcome, a straightforward declaration by the court that
it wished to join those states that shift the burden of proof to
undisciplined storekeepers would have been plainly rational.
Anti-business, some might say, but nonetheless rational.
Perhaps the justices embraced the illogic of their new rule
for fear of being labeled liberal activists, a moniker imposed, with
some justification, upon courts that presumptuously circumvent

18
19

HURLEY, supra note 16, at 268–69; COHEN & NAGEL, supra note 16, at 78–79.
Ortega, 36 P.3d at 18.
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the legislative process.20 But the price they paid was dear. In an
ostensible effort to clarify existing law and so avoid the
appearance of implementing radical change, the high court
damaged its integrity by positing as true something that is not
true.21
Let us then be certain of this fact. The existence of anything,
including spilled milk, cannot be inferred from the absence of an
inspection meant to discover that thing. On the other hand, as
the aging Justice Holmes once suggested, “the law is what judges
say it is.”22 Jurisprudential theories aside, a state supreme court
undeniably has the power of judicial fiat. Accordingly, if it does
not like the social consequences of a given law—such as the rule
that allows storekeepers to escape liability when no one knows
how long the dangerous condition actually existed—it should
plainly say so and, if so inclined, forthrightly implement the
desired change. In other words, either show some backbone or
leave social engineering to the legislature. And naturally, in our
democratic society, the latter is preferable if not morally
obligatory.

20 See, e.g., George W. Bush, Governor of Texas, The First Gore-Bush Presidential
Debate (Oct. 3, 2000) (transcript available at http://www.debates.org/index.php?
page=october-3-2000-transcript).
21 Using the categorical syllogism argument above, the Ortega court created a rule
that is against logic. The Court essentially created a legal fiction that “alter[s] how a
legal rule operates.” See supra notes 12, 16 and accompanying text.
22 Brian East, Struggling to Fulfill Its Promise: The ADA at 15, 68 TEX. BAR J. 614,
617 (2005).
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